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Democracy and 
Bureaucracy 
in the USWA 
byjimand Betty Balanoff 
America's labor movement is on the ropes, struggling for 
survival. Many of its leaders seem uncertain which way to turn, 
whom to trust or what to do to secure that survival. When they talk 
about organizing the unorganized, they think mainly in terms of 
how to replace the numbers they have lost in recent years. How 
did labor manage to sink so low after those glorious struggles of 
the 1930's and 40's that produced the CIO? 
Tony Mazzochi of OCAW explained it well when he said, "The 
problem with the labor movement is that it can't accommodate 
dissent. Labor should be engaged in a most vigorous discussion, at 
the rank-and-file level, of fundamental questions that confront the 
nation: industrial change, capital investment, employment and 
unemployment. But it is not. Instead conformity is the order of the 
day."* 
The United Steelworkers (USWA) is one of the most striking 
examples of this problem. After winning good contracts for a 
period of years, they have agreed to accept concessions in their 
most recent contract—concessions which some economists 
estimate will cost the average worker about $12,000 over the 
41-month life of the contract. 
The USWA accepted a pay cut of $1.25 an hour. The extended 
vacation plan, which was initiated to ease job loss in the industry, 
was scrapped. Vacation bonuses, one holiday and one week of 
vacation are gone. Sunday overtime has been reduced from time-
Jim Balanoff is former Director of District 31 (Chicago-Gary area), USWA. His 
wife, Betty, is Professor of History at Roosevelt University in Chicago. 
* New York Times, May 15, 1983. 
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Steelworkers protest Fairless deal. 
and-a-half to time-and-a-quarter. And while the union was 
preparing its members to make all these sacrifices, U.S. Steel was 
negotiating a deal to import British steel slabs for finishing at its 
Fairless Works, a deal that will reduce U.S. Steel's productive 
capacity by 13 per cent and eliminate 3,000 American steelworkers' 
jobs. 
The manner in which the union reached this decision is 
interesting. Last July President Lloyd McBride summoned the local 
union presidents to Pittsburgh, urging them to reach an early 
agreement with the companies to forestall the possibility of more 
lay-offs or plant closings. At that time both the local presidents and 
the International Executive Board rejected the companies' 
proposal. Concessions, they felt, should not be accepted without a 
fight or without some job guarantees from the companies. 
By November, when McBride summoned them together again, 
the International Executive Board had been persuaded to vote for 
concessions, but the local presidents still rejected the proposal. 
Last March, after eight months of "persuasion" from the Inter-
national office, the local presidents succumbed and also accepted 
concessions. 
In almost no time, several of them had cause to regret their 
decision. Albert Lupini, President of Local 4889 at Fairless Works, 
part of which will close down if U.S. Steel imports British steel 
slabs, is one of those who feel betrayed. He thought the conces-
sions would guarantee American jobs. U.S. Steel insisted that 
President McBride had been aware of its negotiations with British 
Steel all along. McBride agreed that he had been aware of the 
negotiations, but he thought they would be dropped if the conces-
sions were given. Having used the full force of the International 
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union to secure concessions, McBride then launched a war of 
newspaper ads against his once trusted adversary, U.S. Steel. 
To one who has labored in the industry and the union, none of this 
comes as a surprise. It is the inevitable outcome of a union structure 
which provides the appearance but not the substance of democracy. 
The initial structure of the USWA was designed to give the Inter-
national union president an unprecedented amount of power and 
to inhibit membership input into the union's decision-making 
process. Without this vital feedback from mill and shop floors, 
union officials lack a key ingredient for understanding what the 
companies are actually doing. They also lack an independent 
analysis of what labor needs and how to serve these needs. 
Accepting the basic premises of "free enterprise" in a blind 
fashion, they also accept most of the arguments of the corporations 
regarding their needs. As a result, they have become active agents 
for securing advantages for the corporations from both govern-
ment and the labor force. 
What aspect of union structure led to this kind of autocracy? 
Primarily there are three: the almost total appointive power of the 
International president, the role of the union staff representatives, 
and the unusual voting procedures at the union conventions. From 
these three bases other impediments to democratic unionism have 
sprung. 
Powers of Appointment 
The appointive power of the International president extends to 
all International employees except the International Executive 
Board. Elected by the membership at large, the Executive Board 
consists of the five top executive officers and the directors of each 
district. 
The original executive board, with only three top officers, was 
elected by delegates at convention when the Steelworkers 
Organizing Committee transformed itself into the United 
Steelworkers of America in 1942. At that time Phil Murray appealed 
to the convention delegates to rubber-stamp his appointed 
organizers and to elect them as the first district directors. When 
some moved that the directors should be elected by the member-
ship of each district, strong appeals were made to honor Murray's 
great personal contributions to organizing the steelworkers. It was 
implied that failure to accept his suggestion was both a personal 
affront to Murray and a threat to union solidarity.* 
* Proceedings: First Constitutional Convention, USWA, CIO, 1942. 
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Future district directors were elected by the union membership 
in each district. But should one ever be elected whose views 
differed from those of the International president, the union struc-
ture dictates which voice shall prevail within the district. The Inter-
national president, not the district director, has the power to hire 
and fire not only all the sub-district directors and staff represen-
tatives in the district, but every secretary (excluding the director's 
private secretary), every clerk and every janitor. Through control 
of all the subordinate officials and employees in the district, the 
International president can work around or even against any 
district director who displeases him. 
The district directors and top union officers elected at the first 
USWA convention remained in office for long periods of time. 
When new directors were elected they always came from among 
the appointed International staff and needed the presidential "seal 
of approval." This was not a legal requirement. Any union 
member in good standing could run for the district director's posi-
tion simply by obtaining a certain number of local union nomina-
tions, but local unions were generally reluctant to nominate from 
the ranks since they were directly dependent on the International-
appointed staff men to service them. A staff representative-
appointed by and loyal to the International president—might 
punish a local by skipping meetings he had promised to attend, or 
by failing to work closely with the local in developing special 
educational, safety or legislative programs. Worst of all, he might 
fail to move the grievances along to arbitration, might drop valid 
grievances or fail to fight hard for winnable cases. He could ignore 
complaints about shop conditions and let the boss simply have a 
free hand. 
The greater risks to be borne were those of an aspiring director 
who had not first been appointed to the International staff. Job 
rights of local union officials in the steel industry are protected by 
contract, no matter how long they serve in an elected office. After 
15 years as a local union official, a defeated candidate for local 
union office can return to the mill from which he came as an 
employee. But those who leave the steel mills to work on the Inter-
national staff, whether appointed or elected to a position, retain 
their job rights in the plant for only two years. 
By the mid-1960's the staff men of the USWA had formed a union 
of their own. Once they passed a probationary period, during 
which they still retained job rights in their plants, they could not be 
fired from the staff without good cause. If they moved from an 
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A district director who comes 
straight from the ranks, on the 
other hand, has no job protec-
tion at all. He may have been 
president of a large local and he 
may have had much union 
leadership experience, but after 
two years as district director he 
loses his job rights in the mill 
and has none with the Inter-
national. He may be appointed 
to a staff position if the Interna-
tional president so desires, but 
he may also be relegated to the 
scrap heap of unemployment as were Joseph Kender when he failed 
to win re-election as Director of District 28 in 1977 and James 
Balanoff, in District 31 in 1981. 
Role of the Staff 
Presidential control of all staff appointments not only increases 
the gap between leadership and membership. It also erodes the 
respect of the membership for the staff. 
The International has tended to favor certain candidates in the 
larger locals and give them quiet support. When an International-
favored candidate loses an election, he is likely to be offered a staff 
job. This continual rewarding of people who have been rejected by 
the membership is often seen by members as a display of contempt 
for their judgement. Staff jobs are also given to'certain individuals 
for purely political reasons with little regard for skill, experience or 
leadership qualities. While many staff men are able and dedicated 
trade unionists, their ranks have been diluted over the years with 
many others who are merely ambitious and loyal to top leadership. 
These staff men are crucial to the health of the union. They are 
the people who help the locals negotiate contracts. They have the 
power to withdraw grievances or push them on to arbitration. 
When they fail to function at a high level of expertise and dedica-
tion, union members suffer. 
By the mid-1950's resentment of the use of staff men to create a 
union political machine had surfaced. It was expressed in two 
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ways: objections to all staff being appointed by the International 
president and objections to the role staff men played at 
conventions. 
Staff men may be elected as delegates to the union convention 
from their home locals. More often they receive credentials from 
locals which they service and which are too small to afford to send 
a delegate to the convention. The staff's expenses are paid by the 
International. Staff delegates may raise the issues that their people 
feel are in serious need of discussion, but they can also be 
extremely helpful in directing traffic to the microphone in such a 
way as to minimize complaints the leaders don't want to hear. 
By 1956 resolutions were appearing at convention to restrict the 
power of the International president to appoint the entire staff. 
Some wanted district directors to either recommend or appoint 
their own staff; more wanted the staff men elected by the 
members. These resolutions were often accompanied by a resolu-
tion that would permit a staff man to be removed from servicing a 
given local—either by petition or a vote of no confidence by the 
membership. There were remonstrances from the convention floor 
about staff men controlling the discussion, and from 1960 on there 
have been increasing numbers of resolutions to reduce the number 
of staff at the convention—either by requiring a guarantee that at 
least 75 per cent of the convention delegates be workers or that 
staff should be elected from their home locals. 
At the most recent convention 19 resolutions were aimed at 
reducing the power of the staff at conventions. Other resolutions 
aimed at aiding small locals to pay for their own delegates to the 
convention also appeared with increasing frequency. While none 
of these resolutions ever pass, they are no longer countered by 
resolutions from other locals in defense of the staus quo, as was the 
case when they first began.* 
* In 1956 six resolutions were proposed to restrict the International Presi-
dent's appointment of staff. Thirteen resolutions to the same effect were 
proposed at the following convention, but the International was obviously 
prepared to stem the tide for 90 resolutions asked for no change. Since 
resolutions must be submitted well before the convention, 90 resolutions in 
favor of the status quo would have to indicate an organized International 
campaign among the locals to undermine any possibility of change. But 
resolutions to end presidential appointment of all staff resumed in 1966
 4 
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Voting at Conventions 
More subtle, but even more discouraging to real membership 
input into union affairs, is the complicated voting procedure at 
conventions. 
Each local union is entitled to one delegate for the first 500 
members or less in the local and one additional delegate for each 
additional 500 members or majority fraction thereof. Each conven-
tion delegate is entitled to one vote for the first 100 members or less 
in his union and one additional vote for each additional 100 
members, or majority fraction thereof, but no one delegate may 
have more than 10 votes.* 
The result of this provision is that the voting power of the 
delegates ranges from 1 to 10 votes per delegate. Thus, only a roll 
call vote can accurately reflect the membership the delegates repre-
sent. In a voice vote or a standing vote, each delegate is equal to 
any other. 
One would expect that roll call votes would be automatic on most 
controversial issues, but 
none are ever taken. The 
requirements for getting a 
roll call vote are so difficult 
that roll call votes are 
unheard of. 
In order to have a roll call 
vote, it must be requested 
by 30 per cent of the entire 
delegation to the conven-
tion, t This is not 30 per cent 
of those present on the con-
vention floor at the time. It 
means 30 per cent of the 
entire delegation, which 
could well be over 50 per 
cent of those present at the 
time. 
In the manner in which 
this clause has been inter-
* USWA Constitution, Arti-
cle VI, Sec. 2. 
t Ibid., Article VI, Sec. 15. 
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preted by International presidents, it actually means even more 
than 30 per cent of the total number of people in the delegation. 
The roll is prepared by the local unions, and any staff man who 
picks up credentials from more than one local will be listed 
separately with each local which has given him credentials. Each 
time he is listed, he is added to the total number of delegates as a 
separate individual.* We know of no other union that makes it so 
difficult to obtain a roll call vote. 
To what extent does this voting procedure prevent the will of the 
membership from being accurately reflected in convention votes? It 
could be and probably is enormous! 
After the 1974 convention we did an analysis of the voting 
strength of the delegates at that convention. We found that 4,327 
credentials had been issued to delegates who carried 11,941 votes. 
Nearly half the credentials carried only one vote, the others carried 
anywhere from 2 to 10. The 30 per cent of the delgates who had the 
least amount of voting power would have registered 10.8 per cent 
of the vote in a roll call, but the 30 per cent who carried the highest 
amotmt of voting power would have registered 59.4 per cent.t 
Clearly it is possible for people who have more than 50 per cent of 
the voting power in a roll call vote to have too few bodies at the 
convention to meet the requirments to get a roll call. 
Carried a bit further, that same analysis showed that the 50 per 
cent who had the least voting power would represent about 20 per 
cent of the vote in a roll call, while the 50 per cent with the greatest 
voting power would represent 80 per cent. Standing or shouting, 
however, the two groups are equal. 
One wonders if any of the past convention votes have ever really 
reflected the will of the membership. One thing is clear: some of 
the strongest opposition to the International leadership has come 
from very large plants with high voting power per delegate. 
Since 1966, resolutions from the membership have appeared fairly 
regularly to change this voting procedure.}: Some have requested 
* For the 1974 convention we checked the list of delegates for duplicate 
names and found that there were over 700 fewer delegates than the 
number of credentials issued. 
t The lowest 30 percent carried one vote each. The top 30 per cent 
consisted of all the delegates with five or more votes plus 91 of those with 
four votes. 
X The first resolution for a mandatory roll call vote on constitutional 
issues appears in the Proceedings for the 1958 Constitutional Convention. At 
the 1966 convention there was another resolution on roll call voting, 13 
resolutions in 1968, 4 in 1970, 21 in 1976,15 in 1978, 7 in 1980 and 5 in 1982. 
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a mandatory roll call vote for all 
constitutional changes. Other 
frequent suggestions have been 
for lowering the roll call require-
ment either to 10 per cent or to 
30 per cent of the delegates on 
the convention floor. In the last 
decade increasing numbers of 
resolutions have requested 
electronic voting or the polling 
of each district's vote by the 
district director. Given the 
present voting procedure, 
however, nothing is passable 
without either executive board 
support or total mobilization of 
the delegates. 
Tightening the Grip 
Despite all the built-in 
constitutional guarantees for a 
self-perpetuat ing un ion 
bureaucracy, there have been 
revolts from time to time, both palace revolts and attempted risings 
from the ranks. After each challenge, however, the International 
has moved to tighten its grip on the bureaucracy and to eliminate 
whatever possibilities remained for an active democratic life within 
the union. 
A major rising from the ranks occurred in the late 1950s after 
David J. McDonald inaugurated a new era in USWA history, th£ 
era sometimes referred to as''tuxedo unionism." McDonald opened 
the 1956 Los Angeles convention with a glowing speech about 
"people's capitalism" and "mutual trusteeship" and ended it 
with a huge battle over raising union dues. Hostility to a dues 
increase was stimulated in part by a feeling that the old rough-and-
rugged linion leaders were being replaced by a new breed of 
professional bureaucrats, "business unionists," and that the 
workers were being given the business. 
There had been much discussion about technology displacing 
workers in the steel industry, and some union members felt their 
leaders were more concerned about keeping the union's income 
sufficient to support the existing bureaucracy than they were about 
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the members' problems. Opposition to the dues increase was 
strongest among the lower paid workers, especially Blacks, and 
there was serious dissent at that convention. 
One delegate, a relatively unknown griever from Local 2227 in 
Pennsylvania, decided to keep the protesters together, build a 
national movement and run for International President of USWA. 
Don Rarick challenged McDonald for leadership and lost. He was 
subjected to intense public ridicule and hostility at the next two 
conventions, much of it coming from the podium. In the 1958 
convention he was the object of a special resolution on dual 
unionism. Strong hints from top officials implied that he was, on 
the one hand, the tool of communists and, on the other, the tool of 
the steel corporations. At the 1960 convention he was physically 
attacked. 
In 1962 Article V, Sec. 5 of the USWA constitution was amended 
to increase the number of nominations required to run for all 
International offices. This was an attempt to avert future 
challenges from the ranks. It placed a greater burden on aspiring 
office holders from the ranks, who lacked the wide contacts with 
numerous local unions that were available to staff men. 
Expressions of dissent and distrust from the ranks continued 
through hundreds of convention resolutions to reduce the salaries 
of International officials or to force their retirement by a given age. 
In a place revolt in 1965, I.W. Abel upset McDonald and 
promised to return the union to the rank and file. His first conven-
tion was open and friendly in tone, especially when compared to 
those run by his predecessor. But all the old requests for easing 
qualifications for running for international office or for roll call 
votes were glossed over, as Abel explained how tiresome and time 
consuming roll-call voting could be. 
The next challenge, which led to a further tightening of the 
controls, was the presidential bid of Ed Sadlowski in 1977. 
Sadlowski had been president of a large local union at a very 
young age when he was appointed to the International staff, 
presumably to defuse him as a potential dissident. But he proved 
uncooperative, running against and beating the International-
approved candidate for Director of District 31 in 1975. 
In 1977 Sadlowski decided to oppose Lloyd McBride for Inter-
national president when Abel retired. McBride was also a District 
Director, long favored by top union officials but not their first 
choice for the presidency. McBride had himself been engaged in a 
bit of a palace revolt, and he determined not to let it happen to him 
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once he achieved the top office. Two years after Sadlowski's 
unsuccessful race for the presidency, new election rules were 
adopted. These practically ensure that such a challenge will never 
occur again. 
Section 27 was added to Article V of the constitution, forbidding 
candidates for any International position to accept financial 
support from anyone other than union members. It also provided 
for an elaborate, time-consuming financial report from each 
candidate and a committee to enforce the rules. Those who cannot 
use International business, with its accompanying expense 
account, to travel around the country to conduct their campaign 
now have a horrendous fund-raising task in order to mount a 
national campaign. These rules make it illegal for even wives or 
parents of steelworkers to contribute to their election or buy raffle 
tickets to support their campaign. 
Conclusion 
The USWA by general standards is a good union, a clean union 
with no connections to organized crime. There are occasional 
assaults on union members at convention, especially on those who 
Jim Balanoff at USWA Convention. 
have been denounced from the podium, but the union is not goon-
ridden in comparison to some. USWA officials enjoy a high living 
standard, but many other unions offer a higher level of luxury to 
their leaders. The USWA's failures are those of an entrenched 
bureaucracy—pettiness and complacency—made possible by a 
structure that offers it unusual protection from challenge from the 
membership. 
The mentality of the big city political machine prevails 
throughout. Initiative is lacking in preparing for hard changes. The 
will to struggle has long been spent. The greatest failure of USWA 
leadership is its deference to corporate leaders, its willingness to 
trust them in the face of their constant duplicity. That one flaw, at 
least, might have been remedied if criticism from below had ever 
been viewed as legitimate instead of treasonous, or if the union 
structure had permitted some real power to local union members. 
But it is not inevitable that the labor movement continue on this 
self-destructive path. Change for the better is possible if leadership 
is provided and if channels are opened to mobilize that 
considerable amount of energy which frustration and hard times 
are generating among rank-and-file workers and the unemployed. 
For the steelworkers union, regeneration must begin with some 
basic structural changes to make the union reflect the real will of its 
elected representatives. Such changes might include: 
^Regular roll call voting at convention, preferably by the use of 
electronic equipment. At the very minimum, roll call votes 
should be taken on all major policy questions and at the 
request of no more than 20 per cent of the delegates present 
on the convention floor. 
i^Equal access to all candidates for union office to district or 
national conferences and union publications. 
^Decentralization of appointment power, allowing each 
district director to hire their own subordinates. 
i^Equal limitations on campaign expenditures for all 
candidates, by permitting union members to authorize 
deductions for political purposes to finance the printing and 
distribution of the programs of all candidates. 
^Protection of the job rights of candidates elected from the 
ranks to the International Executive Board. 
^ Referendum vote on all union contracts. 
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s Addition of a Spanish language section to Steel Labor, the 
International newspaper, to make sure that all basic informa-
tion is equally available to Spanish-speaking union members. 
Such changes would permit a great flow of energy and informa-
tion from the ranks to top union leadership, but they need to be 
accompanied by another effort—an effort to develop a labor-
oriented brain trust, skilled technicians and intellectuals who know 
how to do hard research, who could free the labor movement from 
so much dependence on corporations for their information and 
their plans. Most major unions already have a number of such 
people on their staffs, but they are generally as stifled and 
frustrated in their work as the mill workers they try to serve. 
Colleges have many idealistic young people today who would 
flock to a revitalized labor movement as they flocked to the CIO in 
the 1930's. 
Last, but by no means least, the American labor movement 
needs to return to its original premise: ORDINARY PEOPLE 
MATTER! They cannot be discarded like old rags or scrap metal. 
And those who propose to lead them must be prepared to develop 
a new industrial policy for the nation as a whole, prepared to move 
whatever mountains need to be moved in order to feed, educate 
and develop our nation's children and maintain the dignity and 
self-respect of our adult population. If this means 6-hour workdays 
at full pay, national legislation to control the export of capital, or a 
whole complex of changes that fly in the face of our normal manner 
of doing business, labor leaders must be willing and able to help 
our nation understand the inevitability of change and the 
desirability of collectively controlling its course for the common 
good. 
